Grounded Nationalism and Cultural Diversity

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1 Introduction

Nationalism is often perceived as an aberrant belief system and practice that goes against the dominant globalist and cosmopolitan ethos of the contemporary world. In journalistic and some academic accounts nationalism is regularly labelled as a relic of 19th century or as an attempt by the far-right populists to revert the course of history. In this context the pronounced visibility of recent populist and nativist movements has been dubbed ‘the neo-nationalist resurgence’ that goes against the grain of modern realities.

However, in this chapter I challenge such views. I argue that rather than being a radical anomaly nationalism underpins the organisational, ideological and micro-interactional foundations of modernity. Hence the current instances of nationalist ideas and practices can only be properly understood if analysed through the historical prism of longue durée. Such a historically rooted analysis shows that nationalism has not experienced sudden rise but has been continually expanding over the last two hundred and fifty years. The intensity and strength of nationalism in modernity stems from the organisational and ideological dominance of the specific mode of polity that maintains a hegemonic position in the contemporary world – the nation-state.

2 How New is Neo-Nationalism?

In November 2016 the Economist published an editorial ‘New Nationalism’ where it identified Donald Trump’s electoral success as following in the footsteps of ideological change taking place in other parts of the world. The editorial was unambiguous in its assessment stating that ‘with his call to put “America First”, Donald Trump is the latest recruit to a dangerous nationalism’ (The Economist 2016, 1). This message was also illustrated with a striking and memorable cover page featuring Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Nigel Farage and Marine Le Pen dressed up as the 19th century
insurgents sporting their respective national flags and playing the war drums. This editorial and the cover page stimulated further the ongoing public debate on the causes of, what analysts have described as a sudden and unexpected, rise of populist and nativist neo-nationalism. Many academics have also taken part in this debate. Hence some scholars argue that neo-nationalism is a distinctly novel phenomenon characterised by a variety of developments that have taken place over the last two to three decades. Several political scientists have described neo-nationalism as a ‘cultural backlash’ where the public opinion has shifted towards the movements and parties that advocate ideas such as strict immigration control, reaffirmation of national sovereignty, introduction of stringent citizenship policies, resistance to the international organisations and protectionism in economic sphere. For example, Inglehart and Norris (2019) explain the rise of neo-nationalism invoking the value polarisation between social liberals who espouse more universalist beliefs and who prefer open borders and social conservatives who are hostile to cultural diversity and reject immigration. In this context immigration and multiculturalism have become the key ideological markers of political polarisation. They argue that the increased immigration or even the perception that there is a substantial immigration upsurge fosters greater ideological cleavage where social conservatives switch their support from the traditional centre right parties to the more authoritarian populist leaders and movements. Thus, for Inglehart and Norris it is the cultural values, not economic interests that help explain the rise of new nationalisms. Kaufmann (2018) also offers a culture-centred explanation of neo-nationalist movements. In his controversial book *Whiteshift* he argues that the demographic changes, including intensified immigration, have generated an ethnic change in Europe and North America which has triggered populist response among the ‘white majority’ populations. Having examined various survey results and other statistical data he concludes that new nationalism is primarily an ethno-cultural rather than an economic phenomenon as it mobilises ‘white majorities’ across the class and status cleavages.

In direct contrast to these culturalist perspectives other scholars have emphasised economic causes as playing a decisive role in the rising public support for the nativist and anti-immigrant policies. Thus Jack Snyder (2019) argues that neo-nationalism is a direct product of unregulated economic policies which allowed transformation of capitalism from the government controlled economic system into an unregulated system driven by financialisation. In his words:

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“elites in the United States and Europe have steadily dismantled the political controls that once allowed national governments to manage capitalism. They have constrained democratic politics to fit the logic of international markets and shifted policymaking to unaccountable bureaucracies or supranational institutions such as the EU. This has created the conditions for the present surge of populist nationalism.” (Snyder 2019, 1)

Similarly, Takis Fotopoulos (2016) insists that neo-nationalism has economic foundations as it emerges in the global environment where neo-liberalisation has diminished the power of individual states and has generated profound economic inequalities. Hence, he differentiates between the old nationalism which was centred on the creation of independent nation-states in the ruins of traditional imperial orders and the new nationalism which is a product of neo-liberalism and its victims who now resist capitalist globalisation.

These culturalist and economistic accounts have been criticised for overemphasising single factor explanations while also perpetuating the view of neo-nationalism as a linear and uniform phenomenon that has increased consistently throughout the western world. For example, Halikio-poulou and Vlandas (2019) and Bieber (2018) demonstrate empirically that there is no single cross-country configuration with the continuous increase of populist and nativist movements. Similarly, there is no discernible pattern of uniform and linear shift in the popular attitudes where neo-nationalism spreads equally throughout Europe or North America. Instead the survey data and the election results point to the diversity of experiences across these two continents and the rest of the world.

While these criticisms are valuable, they do not go far enough. The key problem with the current debates on neo-nationalism is that they lack a historical dimension in their analysis. Hence to fully understand the recent developments it is paramount to explore the long-term structural trends which shape the dynamics of nationalisms. The current manifestations of populist nationalism are not the product of some short-term economic or cultural factors. Instead they are the social incarnation of a structural phenomenon that has been developing and metamorphosing over the last 250 years.

However, before exploring the historical dynamics of nationhood it is important to make a point that neo-nationalism is not a new phenomenon. This concept has been deployed regularly for over a century to account for what the observers have perceived to be yet another unexpected ‘return of nationalism’. Even the cursory view indicates that
terms ‘new nationalism’ and ‘neo-nationalism’ have been in use since the beginning of 20\textsuperscript{th} century. For example, Theodore Roosevelt gave a speech in Kansas in 1910 entitled ‘new nationalism’ where he advocated support for the strong federal government capable of securing property rights and delivering welfare provisions to American citizens. This policy was then adopted as his election strategy and was published as an influential book under the same title ‘New Nationalism’. This term was later deployed by scholars and activists to describe the outcome of World War I where allegedly ‘new nationalisms’ have defeated the old imperial structures of Habsburgs, Ottomans and Romanovs. This argument is articulated extensively in a book with an indicative title such as ‘The New Nationalism and the First World War’ (Rosenthal/Rodic 2014). The same concept was later utilised to account for the variety of political changes taking place after the World War II. Hence the anti-colonial struggle in Africa, Asia and Latin America has regularly been described as ‘new nationalism which sheds Western dominance’ (Mattick 1959). In 1968 Louis Snyder published a book ‘New Nationalism’ to explain the rise of various independence movements throughout the world. In a similar vein the 1970s and 80s waves of separatism in Quebec, Catalonia, Basque country, Flanders and Scotland has been labeled neo-nationalism. The influential books published in this period include Nairn’s ‘The Breakup of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism’ (1977), Behiel’s ‘Prelude to Quebec’s Quiet Revolution: Liberalism vs Neo-Nationalism, 1945–60’ (1985) and Tiryakian and Rogovski’s ‘New Nationalism of the Developed West’ (1986) among many others. The collapse of communist federations including Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia has generated another wave of scholarship invoking the concept of neo-nationalism. This is well illustrated with Ignatieff’s 1994 book ‘Blood and Belonging: Journey into the New Nationalism’ or Norbu’s ‘Marxism, Nationalism and Revolution: The Rise of Neo-Nationalism in Communist Countries’ (2002). More recently this concept has been deployed to account for the backlash against the cultural assimilation associated with globalization. The typical book titles here are: Zuhur (2005) ‘The Middle East: Politics, History and Neonationalism’, Gingrich/Banks (2006) ‘Neo-nationalism in Europe and Beyond: Perspectives from Social Anthropology’ or Valdez (2011) ‘Neonationalism in Scandinavia: Immigration, Segregation, and Anti-immigrant Voting in Denmark and Sweden’, to name a few.

Thus, since the terms ‘new nationalism’ or ‘neo-nationalism’ have been in use consistently for over a century one could conclude that this is a too vague and catch all term that could not differentiate between so many distinct instances of this phenomenon. Although this is true what is more im-
important is that academics have constantly been surprised by the 'rise of nationalism'. The key issue here is that the idiom neo-nationalism is often deployed to indicate researcher's astonishment that nationalism has not gone away despite the numerous pronouncements to the contrary. In other words, nationalism has regularly been treated as a historical relic which has no place in the contemporary world. Nevertheless, to properly understand the periodic visible manifestations of nationalism it is crucial to recognize that this is not some kind of social aberration, but that nationalism underpins the modern social orders. Nationalism is not an ideological anomaly that occasionally interrupts the natural flow of social development. Instead this is the hegemonic form of political legitimacy and the principal mode of collective subjectivity in the world we have been inhabiting for the past 250 years (Malešević 2019, 2017, 2013).

3 Grounded Nationalisms

In the traditional historiographic interpretations nationalism is regularly depicted as a 19th century phenomenon associated with the unification of Italy and Germany as well as with the development of intellectual networks and movements advocating the rights of national sovereignty for the small nations in Europe. These conventional interpretations tend to identify the WWI as the pinnacle of nationalist uprisings whereby the collapse of the old imperial structures and the affirmation of the Wilson’s principle of self-determination have finally inaugurated the world where nation-states have replaced the empires. However, as I have argued before, these accounts overemphasise the role of cultural and political elites and largely ignore the wider sociological foundations of nationalism. The key point is that in the 19th and early 20th centuries nationalism was still a minority ideological discourse associated with the upper and middle class urban populations while the majority of European citizens were still attached to their local, regional, religious and kinship based solidarities (Malešević 2019; Breuilly 1993; Weber 1976). It took much longer to institutionalise nationalist narratives and make them a dominant operative ideology of the contemporary world. This has been achieved gradually and unevenly throughout Europe and the Americas while the rest of the world embraced the fully-fledged nationalist policies only after the disintegration of the imperial power structures in the wake of WWII. Hence nationalism became a global mode of political legitimacy only in the second half of the 20th century and the early 21st century. In other words, the idea that neo-nationalism represents an unexpected return of a phenomenon that dominated

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19th century European history and that has since largely disappeared is profoundly mistaken. Nationalism never went away, it has been developing, expanding and institutionalising continuously over the past 250 years. Thus, what the analysts perceive to be ‘new nationalism’ is only a more visible variation of the social processes that have been in existence for over two centuries.

Before I elaborate on this point it is necessary to define this phenomenon. I see nationalism as “an ideology that rests on the popularly shared perceptions and corresponding practices that posit the nation as a principal unit of human solidarity and political legitimacy” (Malešević 2013, 75). As such nationalism is a historical phenomenon that has gradually replaced other forms of political legitimacy and group attachments. Its intellectual origins lay in the Enlightenment and romanticism, and the political revolutions of the late 18th and early 19th century Europe and the Americas. Nevertheless, these intellectual and political events did not create nationalism – neither the French revolutionaries nor Simon Bolivar and other Criollo insurgents fought for the creation of nation-states. Instead these events were largely driven by specific social and economic concerns and it is only much later that these structural changes were justified and framed in nationalist terms. The point is that nationalism was not an ideology that motivated the political reorganisation of the globe; rather nationalism was a consequence of protracted warfare and revolutionary upheavals of the 19th and 20th centuries (Wimmer 2018, 2012; Malešević 2010; Mann 1993). Nationalism was not willed, it emerged through the historical contingencies of this time. Hence it was only slowly that the previous forms of collective subjectivity and political legitimacy have given way to nationhood as a hegemonic ideological discourse. This was a gradual shift that initially affected the upper and middle urban social strata and then spread to the other groups including the workers, farmers and urban poor. While before modernity an overwhelming majority of individuals believed that the rulers have the right to rule on the basis of their divine origins or other religious sources of political legitimacy in modern era political power is tied to popular sovereignty where nation stands at the heart of political legitimacy.

Nationalism is a historical phenomenon that developed gradually through the organisational, ideological and micro-interactional grounding. To say that nationalism is an organisationally grounded phenomenon means that its growth and expansion are rooted in the rising organisational capacity of states and other coercive entities. Initially the nationalist ideas were articulated by the small networks of cultural and political enthusiasts who would gather in the private circles, saloons, coffee shops and beer...
houses and would devise different programmes of national emancipation (Mann 1993; Breuilly 1993). Some of these early, mostly cultural, associations later attained a political form in the clandestine revolutionary societies such as Carbonari, Young Italy, Philiki Hetairia, Young Ireland and many other similar organisations that sprung up in the 19th century Europe and the Americas. These secret societies were influential precisely because they consisted of dedicated and highly disciplined individuals who were often willing to sacrifice themselves for the greater, nationalist, cause. By the end of 19th century a variety of social movements embraced the nationalist projects some of which advocated cultural renewal and autonomy while others devised more politically oriented programmes for independent statehood. However, the key issue here is that nationalist discourses proliferated on the back of increasing organisational capacity. They started off with small organisations such as Young Ireland or Finian Brotherhood in Ireland and have gradually transformed into potent social, cultural and political movements such as Gaelic League or Gaelic Athletic Association. These and similar organisations gained influence through establishing the hierarchical and centralised organisational structure that reached from Dublin to every parish in Ireland.

Nevertheless, the principal organisational vehicle for the proliferation of nationalist ideas and practices has been the state. As Mann (1993) and Tilly (1992) have demonstrated empirically the ever increasing state power was dependent on the development of infrastructural capacity including improved transport and communication networks and the ability of state authorities to police their borders, control their citizens and resources and to increase their revenues through establishing more efficient systems of taxation. At the heart of this historical transformation was the expanding coercive capacity which was successfully utilised to mould ordinary peasants into the nationally conscious citizens. Throughout 19th and 20th centuries the modern nation states have invested enormous coercive powers and resources to homogenise their populations. In some instances, such as with the French revolutionary state, the rulers opted for excessive violence in order to destroy the local cultural diversities – the clerics and peasants of Vendée were slaughtered for resisting the ideological uniformity of the new nationalising state but the French state also deployed other coercive mechanisms to obliterate patois and assimilate their citizens into nationally uniform Frenchmen and Frenchwomen (Weber 1976). Other nation-states deployed different coercive practices but in most cases the focus was similar: nationalist principles implied that local and kinship-based solidarities had to be replaced with the unified national identities. It is no accident that relative cultural and political uniformity of European nation-states has
transpired at the same time when mass warfare took place, for most of these wars were fought in the name of culturally homogenous nation-states (Mazower 2009). The ever-increasing coercive capacity has played a pivotal role in the organisational grounding of nationalisms.

While organisations are crucial for the proliferation of nationalist ideologies what also matters are the ideologies themselves. Thus, nationalism is not only organisationally grounded, it is also an ideologically grounded phenomenon. Although the classical scholars of nationalism such as Gellner, Hobsbawm and Anderson dismissed nationalist ideas as irrelevant and largely incoherent, it is necessary to understand these ideological vistas on their own terms. Nationalism attracts a great deal of support precisely because it offers utopian plans of salvation, emancipation, liberation and shared destiny. The nationalist ideologues articulate their massages in the discourse of righteousness invoking the sense of injustice and the need for freedom in terms of self-determination. The nationalist ideologies emphasise the universalist ethical principles such as that all nations should be free and preferably live in their own sovereign states. This ideology posits nationhood as the ultimate mode of collective subjectivity. It also appeals to shared group interests and responsibilities as being a committed member of a nation entails specific symbolic and material benefits including a sense of political power, economic advantage and cultural prestige (Collins 1999; Weber 1968). However, the ideological grounding of nationalism is most visible in its capacity to mobilise large groups of people and to utilise its key principles to justify a particular social order. In other words, nationalism operates through the ongoing ideological penetration whereby different social strata are brought together into a nation-centric universe of shared values and practices. This ‘nationalisation of the masses’ is a process that is spearheaded by the state institutions including the educational system, the mass media, the military, police, courts, health system and other government mediated institutions all of which reproduce nation-centric social realities. Nevertheless, nationalism is a powerful discourse in modernity because it also attains ideological grounding outside of state institutions: in the public sphere, among the civil society groupings, in the religious institutions, within the private corporations, NGOs and many other outlets.

In addition to its organisational and ideological embedment nationalism is also grounded in the micro-interactional contexts. Although there could be no nationalism without organisational structures and ideological discourses these structural forces are not sufficient to maintain nation-centric realities in everyday life. Hence for this to happen it is crucial that nationalist messages and practices are reproduced habitually on the grass-
roots levels. Simply put nationalism is a potent sociological phenomenon precisely because it is grounded in the daily routine. As Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008) convincingly argue nationhood entails presence of active and reflective individuals who construct and reproduce nation-centric tropes in their everyday communication, consumption practices, and the routinised and ritualised practices. For nationalism to be successful it was paramount to penetrate the micro-level universe of everyday life. This could happen only when the local interests, meanings and attachments become aligned with the wider national narratives. Hence micro-grounding of nationalism entails the continuous translation of national discourses into the local stories: the micro-level solidarities have to be woven into the shared narratives and practices that generate national identities. In other words, nationalism can resonate only when it is perceived through the personalised experiences associated with the individuals that matter to most people – their family, close friends, comrades, lovers, peer groups and significant others (Malešević 2019, 2013). It is no accident that all nationalist ideologies deploy the language of kinship, comradeship and friendship – they depict an abstract realm in terms of close knit and concrete micro-level solidarities – ‘our Mother Russia’, ‘our eternal fatherland’, ‘our Serbian brothers and sisters’, ‘our boys that are sacrifice their lives for the motherland’ etc. The nationalist imagery tends to personalise nations in imagery of a specific individual that many people can identify with as they resemble their friends and family members. For example, Joan of Arc and Marianne have become symbols of France, Bharat Mata of India, Amaterasu of Japan, and Our Lady of Guadalupe of Mexico and so on. Thus, the success of nationalism is premised on the synchronised workings of the organisational, ideological ad micro-interactional grounding. It is in this context that the organisationally reproduced and ideologically articulated doctrine is translated into the local micro realities. Nationalism taps into the microcosm of emotional and moral attachments that individuals develop with their significant others and in this way it feeds off the emotional bonds that are created and maintained on the micro-level.

4 Nationalism and Diversity

Since nationalism privileges nationhood over all other forms of collective attachments it has historically been an enemy of diversity. Initially the nationalist projects in Europe were focused on transforming local, regional and kinship-based heterogeneities into the nationally homogenous populations. This was largely a top down process of social engineering centred on
using the state institutions to mould ‘the peasants into Frenchmen’ (Weber 1976). Although France was at the forefront of this drive other European states deployed similar organisational methods to nationalise their populations. The key vehicle of this process were the educational systems, conscript armies and the public sphere all of which played a central role in the socialisation of peasant masses into the nationally conscious citizens. In many respects this was a coercive process which at best penalised cultural diversity and at worst physically obliterated populations unwilling to assimilate. Henri Gregoire’s Report on the necessity and means to annihilate the patois and to universalise the use of the French Language (1794) became a blueprint for the coercive legal policy that made French the only language allowed in the education and the public realm. This stringent assimilationist strategy was developed further by the consequent governments of the French Third Republic that made the primary education compulsory and forbade the use of all other languages and dialects except for the standard French. This coercive policy of linguistic purity was extended further to Alsace and Lorraine after the WWI where the use of German, a primary language for most inhabitants in these two regions, was banned. The state authorities punished severely those who spoke other languages even if this was done outside of the public institutions and the French politicians were very explicit in their statements that there is no room for cultural diversity in France. For example, in 1925 the minister of public education, Anatole de Monzie, said that “for the linguistic unity of France, the Breton language must disappear.” (Ferguson 2006, 95)

In Central, Eastern and Southern Europe these assimilationist campaigns combined nationalisation of local peasantry with the expulsions and occasional exterminations of ethnic and religious minorities. Thus, during the second half of the 19th century and early 20th century hundreds of thousands of Muslims have been expelled from the newly established Balkan states. The Russo-Ottoman war (1877–78) resulted in massive ethnic cleansing policies with over 750,000 Muslims being removed and killed from the Caucasus. The two world wars together with the Holocaust and the ethnic cleansing policies implemented in the aftermath of the two wars have re-designed European continent making it much more ethnically homogenous (Mazower 2009). In Gellner’s (1983, 139) apt phrase the maps of Europe were dramatically transformed from resembling the paintings of Kokoschka to that of Modigliani – a world of vibrant, diverse and blurry colours into the sharp-edged images of homogeneity.

The North American rulers implemented similar exterminationist strategies. For example, in 1830 president Jackson approved the Indian Removal Act paving the way for the forced expulsion of thousands of Native
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Americans from their territories with many dying in this process. In 1862 Homestead Act allowed the white settlers to take the land from the remaining native populations (i.e. Sioux, Comanche and Arapaho) while using military to violently destroy any attempts at resistance. Although the US was an immigrant-based society it gradually introduced restrictive immigration policies favouring North European over other immigrants and fostering a strong assimilationist ideology through the melting pot project and the view of cultural diversity as representing a non-American activity. Hence the organisational and ideological grounding of nationalisms was very much premised on the obliteration of cultural diversity.

With the collapse of the imperial projects in 1950s and 60s together with the economic boom and labour shortages in the Western Europe and North America new immigrants have settled in the countries that by now have become more ethnically homogenous than ever before. This recently attained and historically atypical ethnic uniformity was also ideological articulated as a primordial condition thus posting new immigrations as a challenge to ‘established national identities’. Although xenophobic outbursts against new immigrants and other forms of cultural diversity have traditionally been associated with the far-right groups the ideological principles that sustain these periodic outbursts are deeply embedded in the organisational form that dominates the modern world – the nation-state. In other words, nationalism is not a temporary aberration produced by economic crises or cultural changes but a dominant operative ideology and a principal mode of political legitimacy and collective subjectivity in modern world. The far-right rhetoric is just a radicalised version of the mainstream belief systems that underpin the world we live in where nation-state is recognised as the only legitimate form of territorial organisation of political power and where nationhood is the hegemonic principle of collective categorisation and identification.

Hence the populist discourses that target immigrant minority populations by emphasising their religious, linguistic, ethnic or racial markers are just radicalising the existing dominant principles and practices which posit a nation as the principal unit of human solidarity and political sovereignty. This is the same principle that underpinned nationalism from its organisational inception in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Nationalism was and remains to be an enemy of diversity – in 19th and early 20th century it targeted nationally ambiguous peasantry, the local, unstandardized vernaculars and indigenous communities whereas in the late 20th and 21st centuries it attacks culturally diverse immigrant populations. While 19th century nationalists were determined to force peasants to become Frenchmen today’s nationalists rage against the religious, ethnic and racial difference ho-
ping to assimilate or expatriate the migrants and their offspring. Neverthe-
less, there is a paradox at the heart of the nationalist project: it loathes cul
tural difference, but it could not exist without it. Nationalism entails the
presence of diversity as an ideological enemy and as an organisational chal-
lenge to overcome. Simply put nation-states are by definition the homoge-
nising machines shaped to mould heterogeneity into homogeneity and as
such they require cultural difference that puts the organisational, ideologi-
cal and micro-interactional grounding in operation. Even the states that
nominally celebrate difference and cherish multiculturalism cannot escape
the structural logic of nation-centric principles that underpin the world we
live in. For example, in the states where multiculturalism is an official state
policy such as in Canada, Peru, or Bolivia, nationalism still trumps cultural
plurality in everyday life and many minorities feel detached from the do-
minant nation-centric understanding of social reality. While there might
be room to accommodate some groups within the revised forms of na-
tional narrative there is simply no organisational or ideological logic to de
develop all inclusive ‘multicultural nationalism’ that some scholars envisage
and advocate (i.e. Modood 2017; Nimni 2010). Nationalism can be re-
framed and re-articulated in more inclusive and civic terms, but the struc-
tural logic of its organisational and ideological grounding continues to
push towards exclusivity and against diversity. An all-inclusive nationalism
would lose its raison d’être: If everybody is included what is the point of ha-
vying states based on the principle of nationhood in the first place?

5 Conclusion

On the one hand we live in a world where everybody is expected to have a
national identity and not having one is regarded as strange or even bizarre.
The general expectation is that individuals should be proud of, or at least
loyal to, their nations. The nationhood has become a second nature and
the dominant nation-centric vision of the world is rarely challenged. On
the other hand, most analysts and the mainstream public are uncomfort-
able with the excessive expressions of national enthusiasm. Supporting
your national football team at the World cup is nice and normal, shouting
at immigrants to assimilate or leave our country is despicable. In this con-
text ‘the unexpected rise of neo-nationalism’ is perceived by many as a de-
viant development that undermines the existing social orders. However, in
this chapter I have tried to show that there is not much new in ‘new na-
tionalism’ and to understand its sociological dynamics it is necessary to dig
deeper into the historical transformation of nationalism. Rather than be-
ing an exception the contemporary ‘neo-nationalism’ is just a radicalised version of the ideological, organisational and micro-interactional processes that have been in motion for the last three centuries. There is no huge structural difference between the discourses that are hostile to immigrants and those that cherish one’s national team at sporting competitions. Nationalism is not the exception; it is the norm.

References