Michael Skey The national in everyday life: A critical engagement with Michael Billig’s thesis of Banal Nationalism
In relation to the Banal Nationalism thesis, it might be unfairly assumed, given the limits of his empirical data, that Billig believes nationalism is banal for everyone who happens to live in Britain at the current time. Given the complexity of a population of 60 million individuals containing four ‘national’ groups, first, second and third generation migrant ‘communities’, distinct regional and class identities and so on, making such an assumption closes down our analysis where it should begin. Therefore, we need to actually ask who takes their identity for granted, who is passionate and mobilised by a sense of national identification and when, who rejects such a framework and then try and understand broader general patterns in order to address the complex question of why. Having presented a number of studies that might be used to problematise or, perhaps, unpack the Banal Nationalism thesis so as to take into account the complexity of particular socio-political contexts, the differing levels of idenitfication and categorization that might operate therein (national or otherwise) and the degree to which such forms are made meaningful through everyday expressions by both elites and ‘ordinary’ people, I would now like to focus on a second weakness of Billig’s model. Although, as we have noted above, a number of interesting observations about hot and banal forms of nationalism are made, the thesis does not incorporate any real sense of dynamism, notably when dealing with the arguments of those who have posited a new ‘globalising era’ driven by ever increasing global flows in people, products, ideas and images.
In relation to the Banal Nationalism thesis, it might be unfairly assumed, given the limits of his empirical data, that Billig believes nationalism is banal for everyone who happens to live in Britain at the current time. Given the complexity of a population of 60 million individuals containing four ‘national’ groups, first, second and third generation migrant ‘communities’, distinct regional and class identities and so on, making such an assumption closes down our analysis where it should begin. Therefore, we need to actually ask who takes their identity for granted, who is passionate and mobilised by a sense of national identification and when, who rejects such a framework and then try and understand broader general patterns in order to address the complex question of why. Having presented a number of studies that might be used to problematise or, perhaps, unpack the Banal Nationalism thesis so as to take into account the complexity of particular socio-political contexts, the differing levels of idenitfication and categorization that might operate therein (national or otherwise) and the degree to which such forms are made meaningful through everyday expressions by both elites and ‘ordinary’ people, I would now like to focus on a second weakness of Billig’s model. Although, as we have noted above, a number of interesting observations about hot and banal forms of nationalism are made, the thesis does not incorporate any real sense of dynamism, notably when dealing with the arguments of those who have posited a new ‘globalising era’ driven by ever increasing global flows in people, products, ideas and images.
In relation to the Banal Nationalism thesis, it might be unfairly assumed, given the limits of his empirical data, that Billig believes nationalism is banal for everyone who happens to live in Britain at the current time. Given the complexity of a population of 60 million individuals containing four ‘national’ groups, first, second and third generation migrant ‘communities’, distinct regional and class identities and so on, making such an assumption closes down our analysis where it should begin. Therefore, we need to actually ask who takes their identity for granted, who is passionate and mobilised by a sense of national identification and when, who rejects such a framework and then try and understand broader general patterns in order to address the complex question of why. Having presented a number of studies that might be used to problematise or, perhaps, unpack the Banal Nationalism thesis so as to take into account the complexity of particular socio-political contexts, the differing levels of idenitfication and categorization that might operate therein (national or otherwise) and the degree to which such forms are made meaningful through everyday expressions by both elites and ‘ordinary’ people, I would now like to focus on a second weakness of Billig’s model. Although, as we have noted above, a number of interesting observations about hot and banal forms of nationalism are made, the thesis does not incorporate any real sense of dynamism, notably when dealing with the arguments of those who have posited a new ‘globalising era’ driven by ever increasing global flows in people, products, ideas and images.
In relation to the Banal Nationalism thesis, it might be unfairly assumed, given the limits of his empirical data, that Billig believes nationalism is banal for everyone who happens to live in Britain at the current time. Given the complexity of a population of 60 million individuals containing four ‘national’ groups, first, second and third generation migrant ‘communities’, distinct regional and class identities and so on, making such an assumption closes down our analysis where it should begin. Therefore, we need to actually ask who takes their identity for granted, who is passionate and mobilised by a sense of national identification and when, who rejects such a framework and then try and understand broader general patterns in order to address the complex question of why. Having presented a number of studies that might be used to problematise or, perhaps, unpack the Banal Nationalism thesis so as to take into account the complexity of particular socio-political contexts, the differing levels of idenitfication and categorization that might operate therein (national or otherwise) and the degree to which such forms are made meaningful through everyday expressions by both elites and ‘ordinary’ people, I would now like to focus on a second weakness of Billig’s model. Although, as we have noted above, a number of interesting observations about hot and banal forms of nationalism are made, the thesis does not incorporate any real sense of dynamism, notably when dealing with the arguments of those who have posited a new ‘globalising era’ driven by ever increasing global flows in people, products, ideas and images.