Daniele Conversi The left and nationalism: from the French Revolution to the Anthropocene
INTRODUCTION
The left/right divide is a constitutive aspect of modern politics, shaped by the French Revolution, the ascent of the bourgeoisie as the dominant political force and the conflict-ridden advent of democratic politics. Since the Revolution, the left has remained symmetrically opposed to the right in the shaping of parliaments and other representative institutions. While those positioned on the left originally identified themselves as patriots, the cult of la Patrie (the Fatherland) was slowly appropriated by the right. Around 130 years after the Revolution, this appropriation culminated in the rise of the authoritarian and fascist regimes between World War I and World War II. Since then, the association has remained almost unshakable. Despite some interludes, like the rise of anti-colonialism, post-colonialism and stateless nationalism, nationalism and patriotism have remained a prerogative of the right, although it should not necessarily be so. This chapter explores the gradual evolution of the left/right dichotomy and its shifting relationship with nationalism, speculating on how new constellations of power at the edges of modernity are drastically altering notions of left and right.
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE
The left/right divide, as we know it today, originated during the French Revolution. When the National Assembly first met in 1789, supporters of the king sat on the right while supporters of the Revolution sat on the left – although the distinction did not yet have the ideological connotations it has today. The association between the left and nationalism also dates back to this time; in fact, the left also described itself variously as the party of the people, the party of the nation or the ‘National Party’. The term ‘left’ has varied with the vicissitudes of history, but, until recently, maintained its original oppositional meaning in contrast to the ‘right’ (Laponce, 1981). Such fluctuations are perhaps more significant than semantic continuity: the left has always been conceived in opposition to the right, and vice versa. It therefore remains a relative, even elusive, concept contingent on circumstance. In other words, the very notion of left is dependent on who, and what, is on the right – and the right on who and what is on the left. What has remained unchanged is the contrast, the opposition, so that the term has become ‘the grand dichotomy of the twentieth century’ (Lukes, 2003). The practice of nationalism is rooted in concepts and ideas explored and developed before the French Revolution, particularly in seventeenth-century England (Greenfeld, 1992), but also in earlier times (Smith, 1998, 1999). It was, however, from France that the predominant pattern of nationalist practice and ideology was exported throughout the world. Therefore, one can say that both the left/right divide and nationalism are firmly rooted in the French Revolution. In France, it was nevertheless transformed into a collectivistic principle based on the idea of ‘popular sovereignty’, which in the subsequent years became prevalent in Europe, particularly following the Franco–Prussian war (1870–71). This collectivist vision and ethos reflected an entity infused with ‘superior, elite quality and . . . perceived as essentially homogeneous’ (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 7). Given its association with nationalism, the left and the right shared a ‘fantasy of congruency’ and an obsession with uniformity, leading elites towards a constant pursuit of an impossible utopia of organic homogeneity (Mandelbaum, 2020). In view of the inherent pluralism of each territorial space, this pursuit of homogeneity through the chase for a ‘perfect’ congruence between nation, state and culture was destined to remain intrinsically incomplete, given both local resistance and the difficulties intrinsic to the homogenization ‘from above’. Failure, in turn, led to increasing frustration, all of which combined to make war a more likely diversionary strategy. The amalgamation of war and nationalism peaked just as radical Jacobins were calling on Parisian mobs to crush ‘the enemy within’, justifying violence against civilians as part of the war effort. The combination of external and internal securitization has remained a common bellicist theme of nationalism until the present day (Conversi, 2015). The Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio (1996) argued that the continuing relevance of the left/right divide revolves around contrasting ideas of social inequality: the right considers social inequality to be inherent in human societies, condemning the left’s efforts to reduce it as an invitation to authoritarianism. However, the right also relies on its own arguably ‘egalitarian’ narrative based on an archetypal community of ‘equals’, beyond class, gender, locality and other divisions of the ‘body politic’ (Conversi, 2008). This is manifested in the idea of the nation as an inter-class community of mutual obligations, duties and rights, ritually tested by international conflict and war through blood sacrifice, flag-waving and ‘totem rituals’ (Marvin and Ingle, 1999). As Liah Greenfeld observes, two notions lay at the core of the left/right distinction: for classical liberals who supported free-market capitalism, equality meant ‘equality of opportunities’; for socialists and communists, who advocated state control of the economy, equality consisted in ‘equality of result’ (Greenfeld, 2017).
INTRODUCTION
The left/right divide is a constitutive aspect of modern politics, shaped by the French Revolution, the ascent of the bourgeoisie as the dominant political force and the conflict-ridden advent of democratic politics. Since the Revolution, the left has remained symmetrically opposed to the right in the shaping of parliaments and other representative institutions. While those positioned on the left originally identified themselves as patriots, the cult of la Patrie (the Fatherland) was slowly appropriated by the right. Around 130 years after the Revolution, this appropriation culminated in the rise of the authoritarian and fascist regimes between World War I and World War II. Since then, the association has remained almost unshakable. Despite some interludes, like the rise of anti-colonialism, post-colonialism and stateless nationalism, nationalism and patriotism have remained a prerogative of the right, although it should not necessarily be so. This chapter explores the gradual evolution of the left/right dichotomy and its shifting relationship with nationalism, speculating on how new constellations of power at the edges of modernity are drastically altering notions of left and right.
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE
The left/right divide, as we know it today, originated during the French Revolution. When the National Assembly first met in 1789, supporters of the king sat on the right while supporters of the Revolution sat on the left – although the distinction did not yet have the ideological connotations it has today. The association between the left and nationalism also dates back to this time; in fact, the left also described itself variously as the party of the people, the party of the nation or the ‘National Party’. The term ‘left’ has varied with the vicissitudes of history, but, until recently, maintained its original oppositional meaning in contrast to the ‘right’ (Laponce, 1981). Such fluctuations are perhaps more significant than semantic continuity: the left has always been conceived in opposition to the right, and vice versa. It therefore remains a relative, even elusive, concept contingent on circumstance. In other words, the very notion of left is dependent on who, and what, is on the right – and the right on who and what is on the left. What has remained unchanged is the contrast, the opposition, so that the term has become ‘the grand dichotomy of the twentieth century’ (Lukes, 2003). The practice of nationalism is rooted in concepts and ideas explored and developed before the French Revolution, particularly in seventeenth-century England (Greenfeld, 1992), but also in earlier times (Smith, 1998, 1999). It was, however, from France that the predominant pattern of nationalist practice and ideology was exported throughout the world. Therefore, one can say that both the left/right divide and nationalism are firmly rooted in the French Revolution. In France, it was nevertheless transformed into a collectivistic principle based on the idea of ‘popular sovereignty’, which in the subsequent years became prevalent in Europe, particularly following the Franco–Prussian war (1870–71). This collectivist vision and ethos reflected an entity infused with ‘superior, elite quality and . . . perceived as essentially homogeneous’ (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 7). Given its association with nationalism, the left and the right shared a ‘fantasy of congruency’ and an obsession with uniformity, leading elites towards a constant pursuit of an impossible utopia of organic homogeneity (Mandelbaum, 2020). In view of the inherent pluralism of each territorial space, this pursuit of homogeneity through the chase for a ‘perfect’ congruence between nation, state and culture was destined to remain intrinsically incomplete, given both local resistance and the difficulties intrinsic to the homogenization ‘from above’. Failure, in turn, led to increasing frustration, all of which combined to make war a more likely diversionary strategy. The amalgamation of war and nationalism peaked just as radical Jacobins were calling on Parisian mobs to crush ‘the enemy within’, justifying violence against civilians as part of the war effort. The combination of external and internal securitization has remained a common bellicist theme of nationalism until the present day (Conversi, 2015). The Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio (1996) argued that the continuing relevance of the left/right divide revolves around contrasting ideas of social inequality: the right considers social inequality to be inherent in human societies, condemning the left’s efforts to reduce it as an invitation to authoritarianism. However, the right also relies on its own arguably ‘egalitarian’ narrative based on an archetypal community of ‘equals’, beyond class, gender, locality and other divisions of the ‘body politic’ (Conversi, 2008). This is manifested in the idea of the nation as an inter-class community of mutual obligations, duties and rights, ritually tested by international conflict and war through blood sacrifice, flag-waving and ‘totem rituals’ (Marvin and Ingle, 1999). As Liah Greenfeld observes, two notions lay at the core of the left/right distinction: for classical liberals who supported free-market capitalism, equality meant ‘equality of opportunities’; for socialists and communists, who advocated state control of the economy, equality consisted in ‘equality of result’ (Greenfeld, 2017).
INTRODUCTION
The left/right divide is a constitutive aspect of modern politics, shaped by the French Revolution, the ascent of the bourgeoisie as the dominant political force and the conflict-ridden advent of democratic politics. Since the Revolution, the left has remained symmetrically opposed to the right in the shaping of parliaments and other representative institutions. While those positioned on the left originally identified themselves as patriots, the cult of la Patrie (the Fatherland) was slowly appropriated by the right. Around 130 years after the Revolution, this appropriation culminated in the rise of the authoritarian and fascist regimes between World War I and World War II. Since then, the association has remained almost unshakable. Despite some interludes, like the rise of anti-colonialism, post-colonialism and stateless nationalism, nationalism and patriotism have remained a prerogative of the right, although it should not necessarily be so. This chapter explores the gradual evolution of the left/right dichotomy and its shifting relationship with nationalism, speculating on how new constellations of power at the edges of modernity are drastically altering notions of left and right.
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE
The left/right divide, as we know it today, originated during the French Revolution. When the National Assembly first met in 1789, supporters of the king sat on the right while supporters of the Revolution sat on the left – although the distinction did not yet have the ideological connotations it has today. The association between the left and nationalism also dates back to this time; in fact, the left also described itself variously as the party of the people, the party of the nation or the ‘National Party’. The term ‘left’ has varied with the vicissitudes of history, but, until recently, maintained its original oppositional meaning in contrast to the ‘right’ (Laponce, 1981). Such fluctuations are perhaps more significant than semantic continuity: the left has always been conceived in opposition to the right, and vice versa. It therefore remains a relative, even elusive, concept contingent on circumstance. In other words, the very notion of left is dependent on who, and what, is on the right – and the right on who and what is on the left. What has remained unchanged is the contrast, the opposition, so that the term has become ‘the grand dichotomy of the twentieth century’ (Lukes, 2003). The practice of nationalism is rooted in concepts and ideas explored and developed before the French Revolution, particularly in seventeenth-century England (Greenfeld, 1992), but also in earlier times (Smith, 1998, 1999). It was, however, from France that the predominant pattern of nationalist practice and ideology was exported throughout the world. Therefore, one can say that both the left/right divide and nationalism are firmly rooted in the French Revolution. In France, it was nevertheless transformed into a collectivistic principle based on the idea of ‘popular sovereignty’, which in the subsequent years became prevalent in Europe, particularly following the Franco–Prussian war (1870–71). This collectivist vision and ethos reflected an entity infused with ‘superior, elite quality and . . . perceived as essentially homogeneous’ (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 7). Given its association with nationalism, the left and the right shared a ‘fantasy of congruency’ and an obsession with uniformity, leading elites towards a constant pursuit of an impossible utopia of organic homogeneity (Mandelbaum, 2020). In view of the inherent pluralism of each territorial space, this pursuit of homogeneity through the chase for a ‘perfect’ congruence between nation, state and culture was destined to remain intrinsically incomplete, given both local resistance and the difficulties intrinsic to the homogenization ‘from above’. Failure, in turn, led to increasing frustration, all of which combined to make war a more likely diversionary strategy. The amalgamation of war and nationalism peaked just as radical Jacobins were calling on Parisian mobs to crush ‘the enemy within’, justifying violence against civilians as part of the war effort. The combination of external and internal securitization has remained a common bellicist theme of nationalism until the present day (Conversi, 2015). The Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio (1996) argued that the continuing relevance of the left/right divide revolves around contrasting ideas of social inequality: the right considers social inequality to be inherent in human societies, condemning the left’s efforts to reduce it as an invitation to authoritarianism. However, the right also relies on its own arguably ‘egalitarian’ narrative based on an archetypal community of ‘equals’, beyond class, gender, locality and other divisions of the ‘body politic’ (Conversi, 2008). This is manifested in the idea of the nation as an inter-class community of mutual obligations, duties and rights, ritually tested by international conflict and war through blood sacrifice, flag-waving and ‘totem rituals’ (Marvin and Ingle, 1999). As Liah Greenfeld observes, two notions lay at the core of the left/right distinction: for classical liberals who supported free-market capitalism, equality meant ‘equality of opportunities’; for socialists and communists, who advocated state control of the economy, equality consisted in ‘equality of result’ (Greenfeld, 2017).
INTRODUCTION
The left/right divide is a constitutive aspect of modern politics, shaped by the French Revolution, the ascent of the bourgeoisie as the dominant political force and the conflict-ridden advent of democratic politics. Since the Revolution, the left has remained symmetrically opposed to the right in the shaping of parliaments and other representative institutions. While those positioned on the left originally identified themselves as patriots, the cult of la Patrie (the Fatherland) was slowly appropriated by the right. Around 130 years after the Revolution, this appropriation culminated in the rise of the authoritarian and fascist regimes between World War I and World War II. Since then, the association has remained almost unshakable. Despite some interludes, like the rise of anti-colonialism, post-colonialism and stateless nationalism, nationalism and patriotism have remained a prerogative of the right, although it should not necessarily be so. This chapter explores the gradual evolution of the left/right dichotomy and its shifting relationship with nationalism, speculating on how new constellations of power at the edges of modernity are drastically altering notions of left and right.
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE
The left/right divide, as we know it today, originated during the French Revolution. When the National Assembly first met in 1789, supporters of the king sat on the right while supporters of the Revolution sat on the left – although the distinction did not yet have the ideological connotations it has today. The association between the left and nationalism also dates back to this time; in fact, the left also described itself variously as the party of the people, the party of the nation or the ‘National Party’. The term ‘left’ has varied with the vicissitudes of history, but, until recently, maintained its original oppositional meaning in contrast to the ‘right’ (Laponce, 1981). Such fluctuations are perhaps more significant than semantic continuity: the left has always been conceived in opposition to the right, and vice versa. It therefore remains a relative, even elusive, concept contingent on circumstance. In other words, the very notion of left is dependent on who, and what, is on the right – and the right on who and what is on the left. What has remained unchanged is the contrast, the opposition, so that the term has become ‘the grand dichotomy of the twentieth century’ (Lukes, 2003). The practice of nationalism is rooted in concepts and ideas explored and developed before the French Revolution, particularly in seventeenth-century England (Greenfeld, 1992), but also in earlier times (Smith, 1998, 1999). It was, however, from France that the predominant pattern of nationalist practice and ideology was exported throughout the world. Therefore, one can say that both the left/right divide and nationalism are firmly rooted in the French Revolution. In France, it was nevertheless transformed into a collectivistic principle based on the idea of ‘popular sovereignty’, which in the subsequent years became prevalent in Europe, particularly following the Franco–Prussian war (1870–71). This collectivist vision and ethos reflected an entity infused with ‘superior, elite quality and . . . perceived as essentially homogeneous’ (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 7). Given its association with nationalism, the left and the right shared a ‘fantasy of congruency’ and an obsession with uniformity, leading elites towards a constant pursuit of an impossible utopia of organic homogeneity (Mandelbaum, 2020). In view of the inherent pluralism of each territorial space, this pursuit of homogeneity through the chase for a ‘perfect’ congruence between nation, state and culture was destined to remain intrinsically incomplete, given both local resistance and the difficulties intrinsic to the homogenization ‘from above’. Failure, in turn, led to increasing frustration, all of which combined to make war a more likely diversionary strategy. The amalgamation of war and nationalism peaked just as radical Jacobins were calling on Parisian mobs to crush ‘the enemy within’, justifying violence against civilians as part of the war effort. The combination of external and internal securitization has remained a common bellicist theme of nationalism until the present day (Conversi, 2015). The Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio (1996) argued that the continuing relevance of the left/right divide revolves around contrasting ideas of social inequality: the right considers social inequality to be inherent in human societies, condemning the left’s efforts to reduce it as an invitation to authoritarianism. However, the right also relies on its own arguably ‘egalitarian’ narrative based on an archetypal community of ‘equals’, beyond class, gender, locality and other divisions of the ‘body politic’ (Conversi, 2008). This is manifested in the idea of the nation as an inter-class community of mutual obligations, duties and rights, ritually tested by international conflict and war through blood sacrifice, flag-waving and ‘totem rituals’ (Marvin and Ingle, 1999). As Liah Greenfeld observes, two notions lay at the core of the left/right distinction: for classical liberals who supported free-market capitalism, equality meant ‘equality of opportunities’; for socialists and communists, who advocated state control of the economy, equality consisted in ‘equality of result’ (Greenfeld, 2017).