Benedict E. DeDominicis Overcoming the Clash of Civilizations: EU Peace Strategies for Balkan Ethno-Sectarian Nationalist Conflicts
This study focuses on trends in relationships between Serb and Bulgarian ethno-sectarian majorities and their respective, Muslim minorities within a dynamic international systemic context. It does not focus on the Kosovar and ethnic Albanian national minority case more broadly throughout the Balkans, partly because Kosovo has already achieved de facto and will soon achieve de jure separation from Serbia, and partly because of space limitations. More attention is on the Bulgarian case as an example of relatively successful conflict resolution. For comparison purposes, the Serbian case is the Sandzak, a historic region straddling Serbia and Montenegro which is home to a concentration of Slavophone Muslims. Serbian nationalism meanwhile continues to suffer setbacks along with the post Cold War decline of intensity of Great Power willingness to support it as an ally in Southeastern Europe. After the separation of Montenegro from the confederation of Serbia and Montenegro, and the imminent separation secession of Kosovo, the Sandzak region, along with the Presovo valley with its ethnic Albanian population, is most likely to be one within Serbia, together with Voivodina, to witness more demands for autonomy, if not outright secession to join Bosnia. Whereas Voivodina’s largest ethnic minority consists of Hungarians, the Muslims of the historic region of Sandzak (part of which lies in now-independent Montenegro) has an ethno-sectarian concentration of “Bosniaks.” They tend to self-identify with the neighboring Bosniaks with their capital in Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the point that their preferred name is “Bosniak.”
The fact that continuing international military intervention is the primary mechanism by which to prevent most if not all of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina from falling under the control of Belgrade and Zagreb serves as a tempering factor against a strengthening of Bosniak nationalism in the Sandzak. Indeed, a comparatively weak capability to establish a sovereign Bosniak state relative to greater Croat and Serb nationalist aspirations has been an inhibiting factor in the development and expression of Bosniak nationalism overall. Consequently, in the early 1990s, Bosniak strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina emphasized attracting international intervention to create a political environment to avoid submission to Serb or Croat sovereignty. Bosniak self-expression lacks the requisite capability due partly to Bosniak dispersed regional demographic distribution to allow for genuine Bosniak sovereignty. The Bosniak primary intensity identity community therefore must remain dependent and ultimately subservient to the jurisdiction of the state agents of the international community in order not to fall under Croat or Serb control. Cottam and Cottam therefore describe Bosniak identity politics in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as seeking subnational self-expression. This subnational self-expression movement arguably continues among the Bosniaks of Serbia’s Sandzak.
Source: https://www.academia.edu/5627468/Overcoming_the_Clash_of_Civilizations_EU_Peace_Strategies_for_Balkan_Ethno-Sectarian_Nationalist_Conflicts?email_work_card=title
Image source: http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/balkans_1878.htm
This study focuses on trends in relationships between Serb and Bulgarian ethno-sectarian majorities and their respective, Muslim minorities within a dynamic international systemic context. It does not focus on the Kosovar and ethnic Albanian national minority case more broadly throughout the Balkans, partly because Kosovo has already achieved de facto and will soon achieve de jure separation from Serbia, and partly because of space limitations. More attention is on the Bulgarian case as an example of relatively successful conflict resolution. For comparison purposes, the Serbian case is the Sandzak, a historic region straddling Serbia and Montenegro which is home to a concentration of Slavophone Muslims. Serbian nationalism meanwhile continues to suffer setbacks along with the post Cold War decline of intensity of Great Power willingness to support it as an ally in Southeastern Europe. After the separation of Montenegro from the confederation of Serbia and Montenegro, and the imminent separation secession of Kosovo, the Sandzak region, along with the Presovo valley with its ethnic Albanian population, is most likely to be one within Serbia, together with Voivodina, to witness more demands for autonomy, if not outright secession to join Bosnia. Whereas Voivodina’s largest ethnic minority consists of Hungarians, the Muslims of the historic region of Sandzak (part of which lies in now-independent Montenegro) has an ethno-sectarian concentration of “Bosniaks.” They tend to self-identify with the neighboring Bosniaks with their capital in Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the point that their preferred name is “Bosniak.”
The fact that continuing international military intervention is the primary mechanism by which to prevent most if not all of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina from falling under the control of Belgrade and Zagreb serves as a tempering factor against a strengthening of Bosniak nationalism in the Sandzak. Indeed, a comparatively weak capability to establish a sovereign Bosniak state relative to greater Croat and Serb nationalist aspirations has been an inhibiting factor in the development and expression of Bosniak nationalism overall. Consequently, in the early 1990s, Bosniak strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina emphasized attracting international intervention to create a political environment to avoid submission to Serb or Croat sovereignty. Bosniak self-expression lacks the requisite capability due partly to Bosniak dispersed regional demographic distribution to allow for genuine Bosniak sovereignty. The Bosniak primary intensity identity community therefore must remain dependent and ultimately subservient to the jurisdiction of the state agents of the international community in order not to fall under Croat or Serb control. Cottam and Cottam therefore describe Bosniak identity politics in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as seeking subnational self-expression. This subnational self-expression movement arguably continues among the Bosniaks of Serbia’s Sandzak.
Source: https://www.academia.edu/5627468/Overcoming_the_Clash_of_Civilizations_EU_Peace_Strategies_for_Balkan_Ethno-Sectarian_Nationalist_Conflicts?email_work_card=title
Image source: http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/balkans_1878.htm
This study focuses on trends in relationships between Serb and Bulgarian ethno-sectarian majorities and their respective, Muslim minorities within a dynamic international systemic context. It does not focus on the Kosovar and ethnic Albanian national minority case more broadly throughout the Balkans, partly because Kosovo has already achieved de facto and will soon achieve de jure separation from Serbia, and partly because of space limitations. More attention is on the Bulgarian case as an example of relatively successful conflict resolution. For comparison purposes, the Serbian case is the Sandzak, a historic region straddling Serbia and Montenegro which is home to a concentration of Slavophone Muslims. Serbian nationalism meanwhile continues to suffer setbacks along with the post Cold War decline of intensity of Great Power willingness to support it as an ally in Southeastern Europe. After the separation of Montenegro from the confederation of Serbia and Montenegro, and the imminent separation secession of Kosovo, the Sandzak region, along with the Presovo valley with its ethnic Albanian population, is most likely to be one within Serbia, together with Voivodina, to witness more demands for autonomy, if not outright secession to join Bosnia. Whereas Voivodina’s largest ethnic minority consists of Hungarians, the Muslims of the historic region of Sandzak (part of which lies in now-independent Montenegro) has an ethno-sectarian concentration of “Bosniaks.” They tend to self-identify with the neighboring Bosniaks with their capital in Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the point that their preferred name is “Bosniak.”
The fact that continuing international military intervention is the primary mechanism by which to prevent most if not all of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina from falling under the control of Belgrade and Zagreb serves as a tempering factor against a strengthening of Bosniak nationalism in the Sandzak. Indeed, a comparatively weak capability to establish a sovereign Bosniak state relative to greater Croat and Serb nationalist aspirations has been an inhibiting factor in the development and expression of Bosniak nationalism overall. Consequently, in the early 1990s, Bosniak strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina emphasized attracting international intervention to create a political environment to avoid submission to Serb or Croat sovereignty. Bosniak self-expression lacks the requisite capability due partly to Bosniak dispersed regional demographic distribution to allow for genuine Bosniak sovereignty. The Bosniak primary intensity identity community therefore must remain dependent and ultimately subservient to the jurisdiction of the state agents of the international community in order not to fall under Croat or Serb control. Cottam and Cottam therefore describe Bosniak identity politics in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as seeking subnational self-expression. This subnational self-expression movement arguably continues among the Bosniaks of Serbia’s Sandzak.
Source: https://www.academia.edu/5627468/Overcoming_the_Clash_of_Civilizations_EU_Peace_Strategies_for_Balkan_Ethno-Sectarian_Nationalist_Conflicts?email_work_card=title
Image source: http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/balkans_1878.htm
This study focuses on trends in relationships between Serb and Bulgarian ethno-sectarian majorities and their respective, Muslim minorities within a dynamic international systemic context. It does not focus on the Kosovar and ethnic Albanian national minority case more broadly throughout the Balkans, partly because Kosovo has already achieved de facto and will soon achieve de jure separation from Serbia, and partly because of space limitations. More attention is on the Bulgarian case as an example of relatively successful conflict resolution. For comparison purposes, the Serbian case is the Sandzak, a historic region straddling Serbia and Montenegro which is home to a concentration of Slavophone Muslims. Serbian nationalism meanwhile continues to suffer setbacks along with the post Cold War decline of intensity of Great Power willingness to support it as an ally in Southeastern Europe. After the separation of Montenegro from the confederation of Serbia and Montenegro, and the imminent separation secession of Kosovo, the Sandzak region, along with the Presovo valley with its ethnic Albanian population, is most likely to be one within Serbia, together with Voivodina, to witness more demands for autonomy, if not outright secession to join Bosnia. Whereas Voivodina’s largest ethnic minority consists of Hungarians, the Muslims of the historic region of Sandzak (part of which lies in now-independent Montenegro) has an ethno-sectarian concentration of “Bosniaks.” They tend to self-identify with the neighboring Bosniaks with their capital in Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the point that their preferred name is “Bosniak.”
The fact that continuing international military intervention is the primary mechanism by which to prevent most if not all of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina from falling under the control of Belgrade and Zagreb serves as a tempering factor against a strengthening of Bosniak nationalism in the Sandzak. Indeed, a comparatively weak capability to establish a sovereign Bosniak state relative to greater Croat and Serb nationalist aspirations has been an inhibiting factor in the development and expression of Bosniak nationalism overall. Consequently, in the early 1990s, Bosniak strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina emphasized attracting international intervention to create a political environment to avoid submission to Serb or Croat sovereignty. Bosniak self-expression lacks the requisite capability due partly to Bosniak dispersed regional demographic distribution to allow for genuine Bosniak sovereignty. The Bosniak primary intensity identity community therefore must remain dependent and ultimately subservient to the jurisdiction of the state agents of the international community in order not to fall under Croat or Serb control. Cottam and Cottam therefore describe Bosniak identity politics in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as seeking subnational self-expression. This subnational self-expression movement arguably continues among the Bosniaks of Serbia’s Sandzak.
Source: https://www.academia.edu/5627468/Overcoming_the_Clash_of_Civilizations_EU_Peace_Strategies_for_Balkan_Ethno-Sectarian_Nationalist_Conflicts?email_work_card=title
Image source: http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/balkans_1878.htm